Based on the description of Independent director system, the paper is to study the differences about the origins of Independent director system between China and the United States and the differences between Independent director system and the Board of Supervisors System in China. And on this basis, the paper has tested that whether Independent director system has made contributions to the performance of the companies in Jiangsu province by using data of A-share companies. The empirical results show that, Independent director system of listed companies in Jiangsu province is in the state of failure, and fails to improve the performance of the company. At last, according to the empirical results, the reason of the failure is analyzed and the relevant policy suggestions are given.
LITERATURE REVIEW
At present, the existing literature mainly analyzes the origin or do empirical analysis of Independent director system. However, different scholars hold different views on the influence of the system on the performance of the company.
Yang Hui (2008) pointed out that before studying Independent director system we must explore its background and origin. Unlike the American, the system in China is produced under the background of the high concentration of stock ownership and the failure of board supervision under the "dual system" corporate governance model. Qu Hong (2011) pointed out that Independent director system of the two countries is actually based on different corporate governance structures. The functions of the system in China focus on the supervision of the controlling shareholders and directors, managers and affiliated transactions. However the system in the US is more focused on supervising the company's management and decision-making.
The empirical study of Independent director system can be divided into three categories: First, examine the impact of the release of national policy documents on listed companies; the second is to examine the governance system of independent directors; and the third is to examine the effectiveness of Independent director system.
The results of empirical study created by Huang Zhi-xiong and Yang You-hong (2015) on the resignation of independent directors in 2013 show that the turnover of independent directors of the party and government cadres will contribute to the improvement of enterprise value in the short term. Liang Qi, Yu Feng-yan, and Hao Xiang-chao (2009) found that the mandatory documents on the establishment of independent directors of listed companies in 2001 had a significant negative impact on corporate value, but mandatory changes required by policies ignored the individual differences of listed companies. Zhang Li-jun, Xu Hong-mei, Zhang Tong-jian (2016) adopted the exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis to test the governance system of independent directors. The results shows that the governance of independent directors in China is in a good state of improvement, but there are still a lot of problems such as "insider control".
Huang Wei (2014) used the multiple linear regression model to examine the impact of Independent director system on corporate performance and found that the appropriate proportion of independent directors, high independent director size and remuneration can enhance corporate performance. Li Zhuo (2016) analyzed the influence of independent directors' characteristics on the performance of the company. The regression results show that the proportion of independent directors and their attendance are not significantly related to corporate performance, while there is a positive relationship between remuneration and performance. The age of independent directors is negatively related to the performance. The empirical results of Leng Mei (2011) show that the proportion of independent directors is positively related to corporate performance, but the average remuneration and average age of independent directors have little effect on the company's performance.
The Theory of Independent director system
Independent directors refer to such directors who are no longer in any other position except as a director in a listed company. There is not any property relationship, personal relationship and social relationship between the independent director and the listed company and its main shareholders that may hinder their independent and objective judgment.
The purpose of the introduction of Independent director system is to expect the independent directors to play their supervisory functions, strategic functions and the advantages of resource functions, so as to seek better development for the company. Supervisory function refers to the internal supervision implemented by independent directors, which reduces the infringement from within the company. The strategic function means that independent directors can make impartial decision for the company because of their independence and professionalism. The resource function means independent directors can use their own social relations and bring possible resources for the company. The independent directors come from the supervision problem of "principal-agent" relationship in modern corporate governance. Because of the separation of ownership and control in companies and other factors, directors and managers can easily use various means to damage the interests of shareholders, which led to the internal supervision from Independent director system. However, the background of the introduction is no longer confined to the original principal-agent relationship. For example, there are big differences between China and the US, and then a comparative analysis of the origins will follow.
A Comparative Analysis of Independent Director System between China and America
Independent director system in China is originated from the Anglo-American law system and has a short history. There are great differences in the origins of Independent director system between China and the United States. Specifically, it is mainly embodied in the ownership structure, corporate governance, internal control mechanism and external governance mechanisms.
From the perspective of ownership structure, when the US introduced the system, there have been many public holding companies. The number of shareholders of these companies is extremely large and scattered, and they also have a larger market share. The company's management is often given to the Board of Directors elected by the shareholders. Separation of ownership and management rights at the time become mainstream. When the system was introduced in China, listed companies generally existed controlling shareholders, mainly because at that time the majority of listed companies are made by the state-owned enterprises and the controlling shareholders are mostly state-owned investment entities. At the same time the emerging private listed companies have a serious family-based tendency. Coupled with the slow development of domestic institutional investors, the controlling shareholder was prevalent at that time, and shareholding ratio of the controlling shareholder was much higher than that of the second largest shareholder. From the perspective of corporate governance, both the US and China have the phenomenon of "insider control" when they set up independent directors, but the two are significantly different. In US listed companies, the management actually controls company, and often makes decisions for personal purposes at the expense of the company. In China most of the senior executives and directors of the company come from the assignment of the controlling shareholder, so that the management represents the interests of controlling shareholders and the interests of small and medium shareholders are extremely vulnerable. From the perspective of internal control mechanism, the US listed companies adopt "unitary system" governance model, so the board of directors is in fact controlled by the senior management, and loses the ability of supervision. The listed companies in China adopt "dual system" mode, that is, the establishment of a special board of supervisors. Because the law only gives them extremely limited power, and in practice they are always nominated by controlling shareholder. The independence of the board of supervisors is very restricted, resulting in the board of supervisors is often useless. External governance mechanism means that the external corporate merger market, manager market, institutional investors and other factors can supervise the management. When Independent director system was developed in the US, the capital market had been sufficiently developed, so that external governance mechanisms can effectively impose undue pressure on listed companies to encourage the establishment of the system. In contrast, China's listed companies were facing the failure situation of external governance mechanism, which requires the introduction of the system to strengthen internal control.
Comparative Analysis of Independent Director System and Supervisory Board System in China
Different from countries such as America's "unitary system" corporate governance structure, China's listed companies adopt a "dual system" and the company has a board of supervisors as an independent monitoring body. In 2001, independent director system was introduced in our country, which leaded to a degree of overlap between the independent directors and the supervisory board. For example, both of them could propose to convene the board of directors and EGM (Extraordinary general meeting). Also both of them can check the company's financial and hire intermediary.
However, independent directors and board of supervisors have their own unique functions. In the Company Law, the Board of Supervisors has five functions and two of them are unique. One is to supervise and even put forward proposals to recall when the directors or senior managements violate laws, Articles of Association and Resolutions of the Shareholders' Meeting. The other is to require directors and senior management to correct the behavior that damage the interests of the company. In addition, directors under the supervision of supervisors includes, of course, independent directors, so once the independent directors harm the interests of the company or act illegally, the board of supervisors can intervene and ask for correction.
The independent directors have six special powers and four of them are unique, such as independent judgment of major related party transactions. In addition, compared with the functions of the supervisors, the functions of the independent directors are more related to the financial aspects of the company.
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR SYSTEM AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
In essence, the establishment of the system is to alleviate the phenomenon of "insider control", and ultimately improve the company's management. In addition, even if the company's performance does not directly reflect the role of independent directors, but the improvement in performance can be considered as benefiting from the system. Therefore, the performance can be used as an indirect indicator of the effectiveness of Independent director system.
The Establishment of the Model and the Selection of Data
This paper establishes the multiple linear regression model to analyze the influence of Independent director system on the performance of the company. Due to the limited disclosure of independent directors, and the large differences in economic development between different regions, these factors may affect the credibility of the conclusions. Therefore, this paper selects the data of A-share listed companies in Jiangsu province as the research object, and filters the data in the following order: First, because the accounting treatment in the financial industry is different, the six ST companies are eliminated; then collect and disposal data from 278 A-share listed companies and eliminate companies with missing data; Finally 103 A-share listed companies are retained. The definitions and explanations of the variables in the model are shown in Table 1 . The data are from the CSMAR database and the RESSET database, and some of the data are filled by the company's annual report. 
Empirical analysis
Correlation analysis can be used to test whether there is a multiple co-linearity between variables: the multiple co-linearity between the explanatory variables may lead to an inaccurate regression results. From the correlation coefficient table, we can find that the correlation coefficients between Tobin's Q Ratio and average remuneration, the proportion as well as the size are large. The multiple co-linearity also exists between EPS or ROE and average remuneration of independent directors. In addition, it can be found that the independent directors' characteristic variables have different effects on different performance indicators, i.e., different explanatory variables. The correlation analysis is only a preliminary comparison. The exact conclusion is drawn through the analysis of multiple linear regression models. Because there may be multiple co-linearity between variables, so step-wise regression method is adopted, and step-wise regression was carried out on the four explanatory variables. The step-wise regression method used in this paper is to introduce the explanatory variables one by one. As shown in Table 2 , when Tobin's Q Ratio is chosen as the explained variable, at the 90% confidence level, the models II, III, and IV show that there is a negative correlation between the remuneration and Tobin's Q Ratio, but their goodness of fit is relatively low, and the explanatory variables can only explain the Tobin's Q Ratio less than 8% of the factors. When EPS, ROA and ROE were chosen to be the explained variables, characteristic variables of the independent directors were not significant.
In general, Independent director system in Jiangsu Province seems to be invalid, and did not play a role in promoting the company's performance.
Empirical Conclusions and Suggestions
The empirical results of the listed companies in Jiangsu A -share market in 2015 show that Independent director system does not seem to play a role in improving the performance, and even the increase of independent directors' remunerations will decrease the performance. Such a situation may arise from the loss of independence.
The lack of independence of independent directors may come from many aspects, such as the shortcomings of the nomination mechanism, the limit of independence which comes from the way of obtaining remunerations, the constraints of "part-time" characteristics and so on.
From the aspect of nomination mechanism, due to the phenomenon of "dominance", it's difficult to make full use of the nomination rights of small and medium shareholders; In the A-share listed companies in Jiangsu Province, shareholding ratio of top ten shareholders was up to 89%, the average also reached 54%. Thus, at the beginning of the election of independent directors, the majority shareholder can choose the person who can represent his own will.
From the aspect of selection mechanism, the tenure of an independent director can be up to 6 years, and during this period he or she is very vulnerable to accept grace from major shareholders of the company, making the independent directors tend to be in the interests of large shareholders when they judge the company affairs and violate the original intention of safeguarding the interests of small and medium shareholders.
The way that the independent directors get remuneration can explain why the increase of remuneration will decrease the performance. According to the regulations, the remuneration is often determined by the board of directors or the shareholders' general meeting, and ultimately it's always the case: the independent directors who are willing to represent the interests of the small and medium shareholders lose their chances of re-election. This will eventually lead to a vicious circle, that is, the independent directors became the "puppet" of "insider control".
The "part-time" characteristics will also restrict independence. Because an independent director often works in a number of companies simultaneously, coupled with restrictions of their own busy work and the imperfect information disclosure mechanism, he or she cannot fully understand the business situation and just read the limited data on the eve of the Board of Directors. Eventually it is difficult to achieve the objective standards when the he or she conducts supervision and judgments.
In short, the empirical results show that Independent director system in Jiangsu Province is virtually useless. In fact, I think that the key to keep independence lies in the selection and remuneration incentive mechanism. Now, the system seems to have fallen into a vicious circle-"survival of the fittest", that is, the selection and motivations of independent directors are decided by the company, and only the independent directors who can please the board or shareholders can get higher compensation and re-election opportunities. Therefore, we can start with the election and incentive mechanism to find a breakthrough that can enhance the independence. For example, we can refer to the lawyers' trade associations to set up the independent directors' association then transfer the power of selection and giving remuneration to the association. Or by reference to the approach adopted by the US: create an additional select committee consisting of all the independent directors under the Board of Directors.
Finally, independent director system has only been in force in China for 15 years. Although there are many problems, i think we can start with some aspects such as electoral mechanism, and constantly find new ideas in the reform process; and should not be plunged into the mind-set that attempt to accomplish in an action and halt.
